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Introduction 
“Fairness” has long been one of the goals for which American politicians and 
social reformers have strived.  This may be due, in part, to the versatility and the 
applicability of the concept itself.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines fairness as 
“impartiality, equitableness, justness” and “fair dealing.”1  Indeed, the United States’ 
history is rife with struggles by different groups to obtain that equity and justice—from 
social movements like Anti-Slavery and Suffrage to Civil Rights and Gay Rights.  In 
the wake of fluctuating, shifting, and transforming social movements like those just 
named, however, fairness in its economic sense—specifically as it pertains to 
competition—has remained a relatively constant focus of rhetoric and policy in the 
United States. 
This has been particularly true since the last half of the Nineteenth Century.  
Since the Civil War, America’s economy has seen the advent of industrialization and 
the spread of technology, the integration and growth of businesses, and the Age of the 
Robber Barons—occurrences which I will more fully explain in later sections of this 
text.  As a reaction to this period, President Theodore Roosevelt took steps to combat 
what he and many others saw to be growing economic unfairness.  This included, 
among other things, the elimination of economic competition at the hands of firms.  In 
his notorious New Nationalism Speech, given in Osawatomie, Kansas in 1910, 
President Roosevelt made his prioritization of economic competition and this notion of 
fairness abundantly clear, stating: 
                                                        
1 Oxford English Dictionary Online, n. “fairness,” accessed April 29, 2015, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/67729?redirectedFrom=fairness. 
 
 
2  
I stand for the square deal. But when I say that I am for the square deal, I 
mean not merely that I stand for fair play under the present rules of the 
game, but that I stand for having those rules changed so as to work for a 
more substantial equality of opportunity and of reward for equally good 
service.2 
Echoes of President Roosevelt’s language of “fair play,” “rules,” and “equality” can be 
heard in American politics today.  As recently as 2011, in fact, President Barack Obama 
visited the same city in Kansas to deliver similar remarks.  In that speech, President 
Obama stated that the United States “succeeds when everyone gets a fair shot, when 
everyone does their fair share, and when everyone plays by the same rules…They’re 
American values.”3  He then went on to claim that the free market “only works when 
there are rules of the road to ensure that competition is fair, open, and honest.”4  More 
than one hundred years after President Roosevelt made the economic “square deal” the 
focal point of his legacy, policymakers in America still tout economic competition as 
unique to their country’s history and crucial to its continued success. 
Indeed, while Americans still commemorate President Roosevelt’s crusade for 
economic competition at home, they have also expressed a desire to expand this fight to 
include competition in an international context.  Only months after his speech in 
Osawatomie, in the 2012 State of the Union Address, President Obama asserted that he 
would not “stand by when [America’s] competitors don’t play by the rules,” specifically 
citing increases in the number of trade-related lawsuits brought against China and the 
creation of a Trade Enforcement Unit tasked with “investigating unfair trading 
                                                        
2 “New Nationalism Speech,” TeachingAmericanHistory.org, accessed April 29, 2015, 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/new-nationalism-speech/. 
3 “Full text of President Obama’s economic speech in Osawatomie, Kans.,” Washington Post, December 
6, 2011, accessed April 29, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/president-obamas-economic-
speech-in-osawatomie-kans/2011/12/06/gIQAVhe6ZO_story.html. 
4 Ibid. 
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practices” in the People’s Republic.5  Even President Obama’s Republican opponent in 
the 2012 Presidential Election, former Governor of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney, 
expressed similar—if more harshly worded—concerns over China’s trading practices 
and monetary policy.6  Pollsters on both sides of the political aisle in the United States 
maintain that these concerns are not only bipartisan, but that they transcend 
socioeconomic lines as well, demonstrating not only that America’s fight for 
competition has come to encompass foreign as well as domestic matters, but that China 
has become a figurative “public enemy number one” in that campaign.7  Anti-
competitive practices in China, however, are not exclusive to its dealings with America.  
Just as domestic competition began to dwindle in the United States during the years 
leading up to President Roosevelt’s administration, so too has China’s domestic 
economy been plagued by firms’ attempts to evade competition through a variety of 
illegal practices, which I will more fully explore in later sections of this text. 
By considering economic historian W.W. Rostow’s theoretical framework for 
economic development, in conjunction with historical recounts of America’s own 
economic growth, I will attempt to gauge the economic development of contemporary 
China and to identify the equivalent period in American history.  Specifically, I will 
argue that China currently falls within what W.W. Rostow called the “drive to maturity” 
stage of economic development, and that America underwent this same phase in 
decades following the end of the Civil War.  Given the resemblances between each                                                         
5 “President Obama’s State of the Union Address,” New York Times, January 25, 2012, accessed April 29, 
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/01/24/us/politics/state-of-the-union-2012-video-
transcript.html?_r=0#. 
6 John Harwood, “The Electoral Math of Romney’s Stance on Trade With China,” New York Times, 
March 22, 2015, accessed April 29, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/politics/mitt-romneys-
stance-on-china-trade.html. 
7 Ibid. 
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country’s drive to maturity, I will then examine the various ways in which firms 
attempted to evade economic competition during the relevant period in the United 
States, and compare those methods to what has recently occurred in the People’s 
Republic.  This analysis will reveal that many of the anti-competitive practices that 
were widely used in post-Civil War America are similar to those being used in 
contemporary China.  Because of these similarities, it may be natural for scholars to 
assume that Chinese lawmakers should refer to American history, specifically the 
policies that the United States has enacted in order to restrict these practices, in 
addressing its own struggles.  Indeed, this thesis will show that, in the past decade, 
China has done exactly that.  I will finally argue, however, that any analysis of these 
policies, on behalf of Chinese leadership, must consider each country’s particular 
economic history in order to be valid. 
 
 
 
5  
Rostow’s Stages of Development 
To ensure that an evaluation of contemporary China in the context of a separate 
period in American history is valid, it is important that the two periods in question are 
themselves comparable.  It is not hard to imagine, for example, that a comparison 
regarding anti-competitive practices between contemporary China and something as 
developmentally dissimilar as colonial America might yield little in the way of 
information that could be useful to Chinese politicians today.  One gauge by which this 
comparability can be ascertained, then, is economic development.  To that end, this 
thesis will identify several qualities that the Chinese economy exhibits today.  It will 
then attempt to isolate a particular historical period in which the United States’ 
economy exhibited the same or similar qualities.  In order to obtain an understanding of 
the particular characteristics that serve as sufficient measures of an economy’s 
development, I will use the linear-stages-of-growth model in economic theory—
referring specifically to the seminal piece on stages-of-growth analysis, W.W. Rostow’s 
The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.  In The Stages, Rostow 
argues that, in order for countries to develop economically, they must pass through five 
general phases of growth—each separated by and consisting of specific economic 
milestones.  By observing which of these benchmarks contemporary China has 
achieved, it will be possible to identify the stage through which it is currently passing. 
Before proceeding, though, I would like to acknowledge the limitations of this 
methodology.  First, it should be noted that, by choosing to compare the economy of 
China with that of the United States, I am asserting neither that the American 
experience is the normative model, nor that it can be successfully applied to the 
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circumstances of every other nation.  Instead, I have chosen the United States as the 
subject of my comparison with China because of the considerably large extent to which 
scholars have documented and discussed its economic history.  I would also like to 
acknowledge the limited nature of the stages-of-growth model.  Indeed, even Rostow 
himself has joined his critics in discussing the arbitrary nature of his work.  Noting that 
the stages he lays out “are, in no absolute sense, a correct way,” Rostow explains that 
they are designed “to dramatize not merely the uniformities in the sequence of 
modernization but also—and equally—the uniqueness of each nation’s experience.”8  
This research will therefore employ Rostow’s framework to a deservingly limited and 
skeptical degree.  It will serve as a theoretical “jumping-off point,” from which 
historical and factual analysis will quickly take over and drive the latter portions of this 
text.  For now, however, I will begin to examine the foundation of this model with a 
brief discussion of each of Rostow’s stages of economic development, beginning with 
the first phase, the traditional society. 
Traditional Society 
The traditional society is one in which its inhabitants have a limited knowledge 
of their ability to manipulate the world around them in order to yield more 
productivity—a concept that Rostow associates with the pre-Newtonian world.9  
Because of these limitations on productivity, traditional societies often have to focus a 
great deal of their resources on agriculture.  Although the productivity of countries in 
this stage can vary depending on the amount of fertile land available to them and the                                                         
8 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 1. 
9 Ibid., 4. 
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development of certain limited-use technologies, such as improved irrigation practices, 
the primary characteristic of the traditional society is that production is bound by the 
amount of output that individuals are able to produce for themselves.  In addition, 
political power in traditional societies is often focused in the hands of regional 
landowners—further underscoring traditional societies’ economic dependence on 
agriculture.10 
Preconditions for Take-off 
The second stage of economic development sets up the preconditions for take-
off.  That is to say, because the transition from pre-Newtonian beliefs to modern 
science, including the introduction of concepts such as increasing returns to scale and 
compound interest, is so lengthy, it warrants its own analysis.  During this period, new 
technologies and techniques make greater production in agriculture and industry 
possible.  The earliest example of these preconditions, of course, is Western Europe 
during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries—what many historians refer 
to as the Industrial Revolution.  Britain, relatively ideal in terms of its geography, 
natural resources, and accessibility for trade, was able to advance in this respect much 
faster than its neighbors were.  Indeed, most countries did not develop these 
preconditions on their own at all, instead inheriting them through the invasion, “literal 
or figurative,” of more developed nations.11  The growth of the banking and investment 
industries is also representative of the preconditions for take-off phase.  As output 
increases and markets widen, these activities mobilize capital in order to meet the 
                                                        
10 Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, 5. 
11 Ibid., 6. 
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developing economy’s increasing needs for transportation, communications, and raw 
materials.  The most prominent characteristic of this phase, however, is the transition of 
political power, from the landed, regional, and in many cases colonial interests of the 
traditional society, to the independent nation-state.12 
Take-off 
After the preconditions for take-off have been met, the next phase in the stages-
of-development model is the take-off itself, which Rostow calls “the great watershed in 
the life of modern societies.”13  In this phase, the society has overcome all remnants of 
the traditional phase, economic and political, that might upset the steady rate of its 
economic growth.  Farmers are willing to accept the commercialization of their industry 
as well as the changes in agricultural techniques that accompany it.  Those concepts 
which were novel in the preconditions phase, such as compound interest and returns to 
scale, become habitual and, eventually, institutionalized.  During the society’s take-off, 
the percentage of savings and investments increase significantly.  Even renowned 
economist W. Arthur Lewis, who is credited with inventing the dual sectors model of 
economic development, differing from Rostow’s approach in several key respects, felt 
investment was so crucial that, “We cannot explain any ‘industrial’ revolution…until 
we can explain why saving increased relatively to national income.”14  Also according 
to both Rostow and Lewis, “As the capitalist sector expands, profits grow relatively, 
                                                        
12 Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, 7. 
13 Ibid. 
14 W. Arthur Lewis, “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor,” in Selected Economic 
Writings of W. Arthur Lewis, ed. Mark Gersovitz (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 327. 
 
 
9  
and an increasing proportion of national income is re-invested.”15  In other words, these 
increased savings and investments help to fund an even greater expansion of industry, a 
portion of the profits from which are then reinvested, leading to even more growth.  
Lewis goes on to associate this investment cycle with the process of rural-urban 
migration, stating: 
In so far as [the capitalist surplus] is reinvested in creating new capital, 
the capitalist sector expands, taking more people into capitalist 
employment out of the subsistence sector.  The surplus is then larger 
still, capital formation is still greater, and so the process continues...16 
Out of all the traits that characterize the take-off phase, however, accelerated 
agricultural productivity is the most important, for only after the percentage of a 
society’s labor force that is required to feed its population decreases are other 
individuals able to engage in the industrial and financial sectors that ultimately yield 
sustainable economic growth.17 
Drive to Maturity 
Following the take-off phase is a generally longer, perhaps more volatile, period 
of economic growth, which Rostow calls the drive to maturity.  In this stage, further 
improvements in both technology and technique expand from the smaller number of 
industries affected during the take-off to encompass every facet of the nation’s 
economy, made possible as more and more of the society’s income is invested and 
reinvested.  The relative instability of growth during this period, when compared with 
what existed in the previous stage, is due to the fluid nature of the economy’s industrial 
                                                        
15 Lewis, “Economic Development,” 362. 
16 Ibid., 323-4. 
17 Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, 8-9. 
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makeup.  The extension of physical and human capital to new industries causes them to 
grow at increased speeds, while economies of scale cause the older industries’ growth to 
level off.  For example, by the end of the nineteenth century, the United States’ 
economy had shifted its focus from coal, iron, and the railway industry to more 
technologically complex industries such as machine-tools, chemicals, and electrical 
equipment.18  As maturity is reached, and respective changes in import and export 
requirements take place, the society begins to situate itself within the context of the 
larger, international economy.  This maturity is primarily characterized, however, by the 
society’s ability to expand its economy beyond those industries that initially enabled its 
take-off.  In theory, such a society is able to produce anything that it chooses—even if it 
is inefficient and costly to do so.19 
Age of High Mass-consumption 
The transition from maturity to the final stage in Rostow’s model, the age of 
high mass-consumption, is indicated primarily by two major developments.  The first of 
these is an increase in real income per head.  As individuals’ purchasing power 
increases, their consumption desires expand beyond food, clothing, and shelter to what 
might be called luxury goods, including automobiles and consumer durables.   The 
second of these major changes is a marked increase in the proportion of the society’s 
population that both reside in urban areas and that work in either an office or a skilled 
factory setting.  There are other characteristics of high mass-consumption societies, 
however, that will prove more useful for the purposes of this research.  For while 
                                                        
18 Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, 9.  
19 Ibid., 9-10. 
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societies undergo changes in their standard of living, certain sociopolitical transitions 
occur simultaneously.  Upon entering the age of high mass-consumption, societies 
begin to turn their focus away from the spread of technology and growth and towards 
social welfare.  Indeed, the formation of a welfare state is one of the preeminent signs 
that a society is in a post-maturity stage, accompanied by a shift in the society’s 
resources from manufacturing and industry to the service sector.20  Although Rostow 
concludes The Stages by claiming that the United States has transcended the age of high 
mass-consumption, he does not name a successive phase, asserting that, “even in this 
adventure in generalization it is a shade too soon to create—on the basis of one case—a 
new stage-of-growth…”21 
Contemporary China 
Locating contemporary China within Rostow’s model presents certain 
significant, albeit surmountable, challenges.  As a part of the pre-Newtonian world, it is 
not difficult to classify dynastic China as a traditional society.  Indeed, owning land was 
so closely associated with power during that period that constant battles to obtain and 
retain it meant that land was rarely in any one family’s possession for an extended 
amount of time.22  Should the Chinese Communist Revolution be interpreted as the 
establishment of a nation-state, it is then easy to determine that the primary precondition 
for take-off was met in 1949.  When Rostow wrote The Stages, he was under the 
impression that China had begun an attempt to take off in 1952, as evidenced both by 
the investment goals of the government’s national plan and observable progress that had                                                         
20 Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, 10-11. 
21 Ibid., 12. 
22 Ibid., 5. 
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been made in that regard in the six years leading up to his text’s publication in 1960.23  
He was at that time unsure, however, of whether the attempt would reach a successful 
conclusion. 
Since then, of course, much has happened in the People’s Republic.  Recent 
periods of growth in China can be traced back to reforms championed by Communist 
Party activist Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, which introduced market principles into 
the Chinese economy.  Since that time, China’s Gross Domestic Product has increased 
more than tenfold.24  In addition, the proportion of this number that is fueled by 
investments has increased to approximately 50 percent—far above the 10 to 20 percent 
figure that Rostow offers as a benchmark for the drive to maturity phase.25  
Additionally, the proportion of China’s population residing in rural areas has fallen 
extremely fast—from approximately 50 percent in 2003 to almost 35 percent in 2010.26  
According to Rostow, and supported by Lewis, these statistics are reasonable indicators 
that China has left the take-off phase and that it is currently in its drive to maturity.  The 
remainder of this section will therefore attempt to identify the period in which the 
United States underwent its own drive to maturity.  Again, this will help to ensure that 
any comparison between the two countries in terms of anti-competitive practices will be 
as relevant as possible. 
                                                        
23 Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, 38; Ibid., 45. 
24 “China Has Socialist Market Economy in Place,” People’s Daily Online, accessed April 29, 2015, 
http://en.people.cn/200507/13/eng20050713_195876.html. 
25 “Why China’s Economy is Slowing,” Economist, March 11, 2015, accessed April 29, 2015, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/03/economist-explains-8; Rostow, Stages of 
Economic Growth, 9. 
26 “Lee Yim: Is China on the Right Development Path?,” China Energy Fund Committee, accessed April 
29, 2015, http://cefc-ngo.co/en/expert.php?cid=19&act=con&id=96. 
 
 
13  
Post-Civil War America 
According to economic historians Robert L. Heilbroner and Aaron Singer, the 
several decades following the end of the Civil War were a “dazzling period” in which 
“the face of the country [would] literally be made over.”27  During this time, which 
Heilbroner and Singer call the “industrialization of America,” the advent of new, 
industrial technology permeated and began to affect every aspect of life—from 
individuals’ daily routines and work schedules to the regular, everyday objects that they 
used.  In addition to technology, however, the techniques of industrialization also 
became more widespread, specifically the decline of apprenticeships and the rise of 
wagework in factory settings.  Lastly, although the pace of economic growth continued 
to accelerate during this period, it simultaneously suffered from relative instability as 
production levelled off in older industries, such as agriculture, and began to take place 
more and more in newer, factory-oriented industries.28  In The Stages, Rostow 
specifically names each of these economic trends as a characteristic of the drive to 
maturity phase.29 
Also according to Rostow, the United States reached economic maturity, and 
therefore the end of its drive to maturity phase, around the year 1900.30  This conclusion 
is supported not only by those characteristics that comprise the drive to maturity phase 
itself, but also by those characteristics that make up the following phase.  In Rostow’s 
model, the age of high mass-consumption phase is signified in part by a shift in the 
                                                        
27 Robert L. Heilbroner and Aaron Singer, The Economic Transformation of America: 1600 to the 
Present, 2nd ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984), 143. 
28 Ibid., 144-5. 
29 Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, 9. 
30 Ibid. 
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society’s focus from increased production to social welfare.31  This shift in American 
history is embodied by the progressive era, which directly followed the post-Civil War 
era in the decades leading up to 1920.  During this period, American society became 
much more concerned about the welfare of its citizens, as evidenced by the emergence 
of unions in response to the poor working and living conditions that plagued the 
laboring class.32  In other words, it is possible to situate the years following 1900 as the 
beginning of the age of the high mass-consumption phase—further reinforcing the 
notion that the period between the end of the Civil War and the turn of the century 
served as America’s drive to maturity in Rostow’s stages-of-growth model. 
Once again, my purpose in revisiting Rostow’s linear-stages-of-growth model is 
to understand how to gauge China’s current level of development accurately and to 
ascertain when the equivalent period in took place in American history, with the hope 
that comparing anti-competitive practices in two similar phases will lead to a more 
controlled analysis.  Based on investment statistics and changing rural-to-urban 
population ratios, it is apparent that China currently occupies Rostow’s drive to 
maturity phase.  In addition, due to the spread of industrial technology and techniques, 
as well as the rapid, if unstable, growth of America’s economy in the period between 
the Civil War and the progressive era, it can be deduced that this is when the United 
States experienced its own drive to maturity.  The remainder of this work, then, will 
focus on a comparison between contemporary China and post-Civil War America. 
In the next section of this text, I will specifically examine the kinds of methods 
used by firms to avoid economic competition in the United States and the People’s                                                         
31 Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, 11. 
32 Heilbroner and Singer, Economic Transformation of America, 225-6. 
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Republic during the aforementioned, relevant periods.  This will reveal remarkable 
similarities in the anti-competitive practices used by firms in each setting.  Finally, in 
the last section of this text, I will compare both countries’ attempts to curtail these anti-
competitive practices through policy, and demonstrate that any evaluation of these 
policies by Chinese leaders must take into consideration the degree of involvement that 
its government has historically had in the economy. 
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Anti-competitive Practices 
Of the many forms of economic “unfairness” that President Roosevelt witnessed 
and pioneered efforts to curtail, which I will discuss further in the next section of this 
text, perhaps the most prominent was anti-competitive practices on the part of firms.  
Although there are a number of ways in which firms can engage in anti-competitive 
practices, they are almost always implemented with the end goal of reducing the amount 
of competition in one or more markets.  A list of basic anti-competitive practices can be 
divided into three categories: practices on behalf of individual firms, practices within 
vertical supply chains, and horizontal practices amongst groups of firms in the same 
market.  What follows is a brief description of each category, as well a non-exhaustive 
list of subtypes. 
Individual Practices 
Individual practices are those methods of avoiding competition that, as their 
name suggests, are exercised on the part of individual firms, without collusion.  Perhaps 
the most infamous of these methods is predatory pricing, also known as limit pricing, 
below-cost pricing and, in the context of international trade, dumping, in which firms 
sell their goods or services at particularly low prices including, at times, at a financial 
loss to themselves.33  Firms generally engage in this behavior as a means of either 
forcing their competitors out of a market or discouraging potential competitors from 
                                                        
33 “Anti-dumping,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, accessed April 29, 2015, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/wto-multilateral-affairs/wto-issues/trade-remedies/anti-dumping. 
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entering the market in the first place.34  Other anti-competitive practices on the part of 
individual firms include refusal to deal and tying the sale of multiple products together.  
The former of these occurs when firms deny the sale of their goods or services to other 
firms on a conditional basis—for example, one firm might refuse to sell to another firm 
that simultaneously buys from the first firm’s competitors, in an effort to lessen the 
amount of business that said competitor receives.35  The practice of “tying,” on the 
other hand, is when a firm requires that the purchase of one of its goods or services be 
accompanied by the purchase of one or more other, perhaps less desirable, goods or 
services.36  Each of these methods, when used by firms who already possess some 
degree of market power in at least one market, can help those firms to gain market 
power in additional markets. 
Vertical Practices 
Vertical practices affect those markets that make up a single supply chain.  The 
automotive industry is just one, albeit prominent, example of such a supply chain, as the 
development of cars requires inputs from many individual markets, including engineers 
for design, steel for production, dealerships for marketing, and others.  Some examples 
of anti-competitive practices that affect vertical markets like the automotive industry 
include exclusive dealing and resale price management.  Exclusive dealing, also known 
as requirement contracts, is a kind of agreement by which manufacturers are obligated                                                         
34 “Predatory or Below-Cost Pricing,” Federal Trade Commission, accessed April 29, 2015, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-
conduct/predatory-or-below-cost. 
35 “Refusal to Deal,” Federal Trade Commission, accessed April 29, 2015, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/refusal-deal. 
36 “Tying the Sale of Two Products,” Federal Trade Commission, accessed April 29, 2015, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/tying-
sale-two-products. 
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to buy inputs from certain suppliers.  Insofar as these arrangements are consensual and 
not coerced, they are generally lawful.37  Resale price maintenance is the practice 
whereby certain manufacturers have a say in how other firms engage in the reselling of 
their products.  A common manifestation of this practice is a manufacturer-imposed 
price floor on the reselling of its goods.  If a particular reseller fails to observe this price 
floor, it may result in the manufacturer discontinuing business with them.  Although 
courts in the United States once felt that this sort of resale price maintenance was 
unquestionably illegal, instances of this practice today are reviewed on a case-by-case 
basis.38 
Horizontal Practices 
Horizontal practices include behaviors that directly affect competition between 
multiple firms in the same market.  Just three examples of horizontal practices include 
price fixing, market division, and mergers.  Price fixing represents agreements between 
multiple firms in a single market either to stabilize, lower, or raise prices at the same 
time and by the same amounts, and they are almost always illegal.  For example, 
different firms in a single market might agree to raise their prices at a uniform rate—the 
idea being that, if each firm in the market complies, consumers will be forced to pay the 
higher prices for lack of an alternative.  In some circumstances, then, resale price 
maintenance, mentioned above, can be thought of as a form of vertical price fixing.  
Obviously, this sort of behavior is easier to organize in markets with a relatively small                                                         
37 “Exclusive Dealing or Requirements Contracts,” Federal Trade Commission, accessed April 29, 2015, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/dealings-supply-
chain/exclusive-dealing-or. 
38 Joshua Wright, “Economics of Resale Price Maintenance & Implications for Competition Law and 
Policy” (remarks before the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, United 
Kingdom, April 9, 2014). 
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number of firms, and is more likely to be successful in those industries whose goods or 
services have no proper substitutes.39  A second horizontal practice is called market 
division, whereby two or more firms in a single market will agree to sell their goods in 
specific areas or geographic regions in order to eliminate the possibility of having to 
compete with one another.  Just as with price fixing, plain agreements among 
competitors to divide market areas into territories, or to assign customers amongst 
themselves, are almost always illegal in the United States.40  Mergers are a third 
horizontal practice, wherein one firm will acquire, usually through the purchase of 
stock, all or part of another firm.  Also like price fixing, mergers can occur in both 
horizontal and vertical senses, in that a firm may merge either with other firms in its 
own market, or with other firms in its supply chain.  In the United States, mergers are 
subject to governmental review and approval on a case-by-case basis, in order to ensure 
that they do not “substantially…lessen competition, or…tend to create a monopoly.”41 
Historical Examples in America 
The primary anti-competitive practices used in America during the post-Civil 
War era were predatory pricing, price fixing, and mergers.  The first of these initially 
arose as a response to the instability of economic growth that, as I have already 
mentioned, is a natural occurrence during the drive to maturity phase.  As new 
technologies and techniques were applied to older industries, they would become                                                         
39 “Price Fixing,” Federal Trade Commission, accessed April 29, 2015, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/dealings-competitors/price-fixing. 
40 “Market Division or Customer Allocation,” Federal Trade Commission, accessed April 29, 2015, 
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41 “Mergers,” Federal Trade Commission, accessed April 29, 2015, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
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heavily invested in for several years and, as returns to scale eventually diminished, 
would lose that popularity just as quickly.  This pattern of booms and busts forms the 
foundation of what is known as the business cycle and, although it was not new to the 
American economy at the time, it became far more erratic in the decades following the 
Civil War, as industrialization took command.42  To exploit the rapid expansion of these 
emerging markets as much as possible, larger firms began to cut their prices—in some 
cases to below-cost levels, forcing smaller, less wealthy firms out of the market entirely.  
Competition became “a process in which firms struggled for shares of the market.”43  
For some industrialists, however, this “process” seemed more like an “industrial war” 
that meant “death to some of the combatants and injury for all.”44 
To avoid suicide at the hands of the business cycle and this unfettered, cutthroat 
competition, groups of firms in particular industries formed “pools” to establish 
agreements on pricing. By 1880, these pools existed in America’s cordage, coal, 
whisky, salt, steamboat, and rail industries, among many others.  Unfortunately, 
however, the pools’ attempts to fix prices did not enable them to avoid the business 
cycle altogether.  The situation became a prisoner’s dilemma in which, as soon as a 
particular market became saturated and began to experience diminishing returns, one 
firm after another would break its agreement, lowering its prices in order to increase its 
share of the market and maintain revenue.  Even less conducive to the stability of 
pooling agreements, however, was the fact that participating firms could cheat without 
the threat of penalty.  This was because, even in the post-Civil War era, American law 
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held a tradition that firms could not enter into any contracts with the effect of 
“restraining trade.”45 
The failure of pools, however, did not stop American industrialists from seeking 
alternative means to maintain price discipline.  Businessman John D. Rockefeller, for 
example, had a goal to combine all of the oil refineries in America into one 
supercompany.  In order to do this legally, his lawyers developed the concept of a trust, 
wherein a firm’s shareholders would place their shares in the hands of a board of 
directors, who could then vote on it is as they wished.  Through this mechanism, 
Rockefeller’s own Standard Oil Company would come to control the policies and assets 
of 40 other firms.  By the late 1880s, trusts were an institutional part of American 
industry.46 
And yet, even as trusts offered businesses a perfectly legal way for them to 
control the actions of their competitors, more efficient means to do so would soon 
become available.  This is referring, of course, to the rise of mergers, whereby firms 
could directly purchase the stock of their competitors.  Mergers had been illegal almost 
everywhere in the country until 1889, when New Jersey was the first state in the union 
to change this through legislation.  Although the purchase of Andrew Carnegie’s steel 
company, followed by its eight largest competitors, by J.P. Morgan is probably the best 
historical example of a firm’s use of mergers, the practice quickly became prominent in 
industries ranging from railways and oil to biscuits and crackers, and everything in 
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between.  Indeed, by 1904, one or two large firms controlled over half of the output in 
78 American industries.47 
These large firms, however, were not isolated from one another within their 
respective industries.  Indeed, on several occasions, large firms in one industry would 
actively try to assist large firms in another industry as a form of collusion, in order to 
establish loyal and mutually beneficial relationships.  It was not uncommon, for 
example, for railway superintendents and managers to be accused of showing 
“unreasonable favoritism” by “offering rate concessions to large shippers, charging 
more for short than long hauls, and giving preferential treatment to large corporations in 
the form of secret rebates and drawbacks.”  The Standard Oil Company, in particular, 
benefitted enormously from this behavior.  In fact, some historians contend that the 
primary force behind Rockefeller’s success was his relationship with the railroad 
industry, whose favoritism had aided his company and handicapped his competitors to 
the point where Standard Oil had obtained a monopoly, not only in oil refinement, but 
in oil transportation as well.  By 1881, although Rockefeller’s company only produced 
two percent of the country’s petroleum, it refined approximately 90 percent of its 
domestically produced oil and essentially, set the price for all of it.48 
Recent Examples in China 
The most prominent anti-competitive practices in China today are similar to 
those that existed in post-Civil War America, albeit sometimes for different reasons.  In 
recent years, cracking down on price fixing has been a tremendous focus of the Chinese                                                         
47 Heilbroner and Singer, Economic Transformation of America, 202. 
48 John Tipple, “Big Businessmen and a New Economy,” in The Gilded Age: Revised and Enlarged 
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government.  In 2013, for example, demand for infant formula produced outside of the 
country increased as families felt unsafe using Chinese brands that they feared had 
become tainted.  This resulted in a shortage of foreign-sourced formula in China and, as 
greater numbers of Chinese families began to order formula directly from other 
countries, resulted in shortages as far away as the United Kingdom.  In August of that 
year, the Chinese government determined that six foreign-sourced formula providers 
had engaged in coordinated efforts to raise their prices simultaneously during the 
shortage and, as a result, issued record fines for several of those firms.49  Additionally, 
Mercedes-Benz was found guilty of issuing verbal instructions to several dealerships in 
the eastern Jiangsu Province, specifying minimum prices at which they were to sell 
certain luxury vehicle models and certain spare parts between January of 2013 and July 
of 2014.  This is an example of retail price maintenance, which, again, can be 
interpreted as form of price fixing within the supply chain.50 
Just as the United States’ drive to maturity phase was characterized by the 
existence of monopolies, like Rockefeller’s Standard Oil and J.P. Morgan’s U.S. Steel, 
so too do monopolies exist in contemporary China.  As recent as 2010, in fact, 
monopolies existed in the Chinese banking and oil industries.51  It should be noted here, 
however, that the causes that once led to the existence of monopolies in the United 
States are very different from those that have created the Chinese banking and oil                                                         
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monopolies that I have just mentioned.  In post-Civil War America, mergers became 
popular as a way to “remove the threat of unrestricted price competition that proved so 
dangerous for a world of large-scale enterprise.”52  In contemporary China, on the other 
hand, monopolies have not become more prevalent, but less so.  This is because, as I 
will discuss in the next section of this text, China’s drive to maturity phase is taking 
place as it is transitioning from a controlled economy to a market economy.  In addition, 
the next section of this text will also show that recent efforts on behalf of the Chinese 
government to curb the existence of these anti-competitive practices closely resemble 
steps taken by the United States to maintain its own economic competition both during 
and shortly after the post-Civil War era. 
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Policy Comparison 
One might assume that, because similarities exist between the types of anti-
competitive practices that were used in post-Civil War America and that are being used 
in contemporary China, Chinese politicians stand to gain by studying and implementing 
the ways in which American politicians addressed these practices in the past.  As I will 
reveal in this section, it would appear as though Chinese legislators have done exactly 
that.  While this approach may be beneficial to an extent, however, Chinese leaders 
must ultimately realize that any attempt to prescribe and, eventually, to evaluate policies 
based on what did and did not work in the United States must take into account the 
context of each country’s unique economic history. 
Policy in Post-Civil War America 
America’s reaction to anti-competitive practices took the form of a gradual 
build-up.  Indeed, the federal government only begrudgingly became involved in the 
situation after the states had exhausted their own options—frequently to no avail.  As I 
have already discussed, both American and British common law had traditions of 
prohibiting firms from engaging in activity that “restrained” trade.53  As a result, 
collusion with the intent to fix prices had been illegal long before industrialism took 
command of the American economy during its drive to maturity.  The fact that pools 
were still able to engage in this behavior, as I have cited, was less indicative of grey 
area within the law than it was the result of inadequate efforts to enforce it. 
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As the practice of pooling failed due to chronic cheating, trusts emerged as an 
alternative mechanism through which firms could avoid their competitors.  They too, 
however, were met with disdain.  In fact, many states filed lawsuits against trusts on the 
grounds that, similar to the pools that existed, they too were engaging in behavior that 
qualified as the restraint of trade, specifically by charging “exorbitant rates.”54  And 
although these states usually won their cases, their victories in the courtroom did little 
to address their true concerns, as firms either moved their headquarters to more trust-
friendly states or achieved the same predatory pricing capabilities through mergers. 
Only after states had tried and failed to address anti-competitive practices on 
their own did the federal government become involved.  In 1887, Congress passed the 
Interstate Commerce Commission Act, establishing an agency with the ability to 
regulate commerce between the states—a role that the Constitution explicitly reserves 
for the federal government.  In practice, this act was specifically used to compel railway 
firms to publish their rates, and required that they be “reasonable and just.”  The 
problem with this approach, of course, was that the act did little to specify what 
constituted a “reasonable and just” pricing schedule.  The Commission’s only recourse, 
then, was to sue firms that it suspected of engaging in predatory pricing and price fixing 
in federal court.  The federal courts, however, unlike their state counterparts, were 
suspicious of the new Interstate Commerce Commission, and generally sided with the 
corporate defendants.  As one historian says, “The Fourteenth Amendment, whether 
intended for such purposes or not, was used by the courts to protect the corporation and 
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to prevent attempts by the states to undermine its position of power.”55  Between 1887 
and 1905, for example, the Supreme Court issued rulings in favor of the railway 
industry in 15 out of the 16 cases that the Interstate Commerce Commission had 
brought before it.56 
It was not long after the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
however, that the federal government turned its attention from railroad trusts to trusts in 
every industry.  In 1890, Congress overwhelmingly passed the famous Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, which declared that “every contract, combination in form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade among the several States…is hereby 
declared to be illegal,” and that “every person who shall monopolize or attempt to 
monopolize…shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.”57  In other words, the 
Sherman Act did not persecute or prohibit specific anti-competitive practices, such as 
the predatory pricing that the Interstate Commerce Commission was initially tasked 
with exposing.  Instead, it outlawed the mere existence of trusts and monopolies.  And 
yet, most business owners simply ignored the Sherman Antitrust Act altogether.  In fact, 
it was not until after its passage that the merger movement reached its peak.58  As with 
the Interstate Commerce Commission Act, this failing was the result of a Supreme 
Court that interpreted the legislation very conservatively.  In 1895, for example, the 
Court ruled that the American Sugar Company’s control of effectively all of the sugar 
refineries in the United States was legal because it pertained specifically to the 
manufacture of sugar, as opposed to commerce between the states—the precept on                                                         
55 Tipple, “Big Businessmen,” 15. 
56 Heilbroner and Singer, Economic Transformation of America, 208. 
57 Ibid., 209-10. 
58 Ibid., 210-1. 
 
 
28  
which the federal government derived almost all of its regulatory authority.59  Indeed, 
America’s efforts to curb monopolistic operations did not gain significant progress or 
legal precedence until 1904 when, in a landmark lawsuit, President Roosevelt 
triumphed over the Northern Securities Company, dismantling the monopoly that it had 
obtained over railway transportation in the western United States, and earning himself 
the title of “trust-buster.”60  It is notable, however, that this portion of American history 
represents a shift from less government involvement in the economy to more.  As I will 
now discuss, this has not been the case in contemporary China. 
Policy in Contemporary China 
Between 1949 and 1978, China’s economy was controlled, almost entirely, by 
its own communist government.  For much of that time, as the result of inefficiencies 
and bad investments, the Chinese economy performed quite poorly relative to other East 
Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea, and what is now Taiwan.61  Following 
the death of Chairman Mao Zedong, however, the Communist Party of China began to 
turn away from a controlled system and toward market principles.62  Championed by 
party activist Deng Xiaoping, this program of economic reformation, known as 
“Socialism with Chinese characteristics,” occurred in what can roughly be broken into a 
set of two waves.  The first of these waves, occurring during the late 1970s and early 
1980s, lessened the amount of agricultural planning that was conducted by the central 
government, opened the country to investment by foreign entities, and provided                                                         
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entrepreneurs with the ability to start their own businesses.  Most of China’s larger 
industries, however, remained owned by the state.63  In the second wave of reforms, 
which took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Chinese government allowed for 
the contracting out, and in some cases the privatization, of numerous state-owned 
industries, as well as the elimination of many price controls, tariffs, and other 
regulations. Whereas American history is characterized by a gradual increase in 
government control, then, recent trends in the People’s Republic suggest that the 
opposite is true for China—that is, over time, the Chinese government has relinquished 
more and more of its control over the economy. And yet, to this day, the Chinese 
government still owns monopolies in the petroleum and banking industries.  This 
becomes even more perplexing, however, in light of the fact that the Chinese 
government has, in the past decade, enacted sweeping legislation to end the use of anti-
competitive practices, including a number of strong anti-monopoly provisions.64 
The first significant piece of Chinese legislation aimed at curtailing anti-
competitive practices was the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.  In 1987, China’s 
Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council assembled a drafting team to develop a 
law combining both anti-monopoly and other anti-unfair competition characteristics.  
The first draft of this law was completed in 1988, but it was vetoed shortly thereafter 
because it was deemed that, at the time, monopolies were not prevalent enough to 
warrant such legislation.  As a result, the drafting team cut out the anti-monopoly 
portions of the law and, in 1993, the remaining sections were adopted as China’s Anti-
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Unfair Competition Law.65  Because the initial goal with this piece of legislation was 
for it to be all-encompassing and comprehensive, it pertains to a variety of anti-
competitive practices, including “tying”  and price fixing, as well as less apparent 
practices such as bid rigging, deceptive advertising, bribery, crony capitalism, and the 
appropriation of business secrets.  In the years following the passage of the Anti-Unfair 
Competition Law, smaller, more focused pieces of legislation would also be enacted, 
including the Commercial Banking Law of 1995, the Price Law of 1997, and the 
Procurement and Bidding Law of 1999—each of which supplemented and expanded 
upon those regulations promulgated by the aforementioned Anti-Unfair Competition 
Law.66 
 Shortly after the initial anti-monopoly, anti-unfair competition hybrid 
legislation was vetoed in 1988, an anti-monopoly law team was assembled in order to 
draft a new version of the failed anti-monopoly portions of the law, for passage at a 
later date.  This second draft was finished in 1994, but it was not introduced to the 
National People’s Congress until 2004, after a special report was released by the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, warning that foreign firms might soon 
come to monopolize certain Chinese markets.  In response to this report, the Anti-
Monopoly Law was passed by the National People’s Congress in August of 2007.67   
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This landmark piece of legislation prohibits monopoly agreements, as well as 
other abuses of dominant market position, and institutes mandatory reporting and 
government approval of merger and acquisition deals.68  In order to enforce these 
provisions, the Chinese government has enlisted the help of three separate 
administrative agencies.  The Antimonopoly Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce, for 
example, is responsible for reviewing and approving mergers and acquisitions.  The 
Price Supervision and Antimonopoly Bureau of the National Development and Reform 
Commission, on the other hand, is responsible for investigating price-related anti-
competitive practices.  Lastly, the Antimonopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Bureau 
of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce is responsible for investigating 
non-price-related behaviors.69 
These policies obviously bear a number of similarities to those that were enacted 
both during and shortly after the post-Civil War era in America.  For one, both 
countries’ legislation seems to address largely the same set of anti-competitive 
practices, namely price fixing and predatory pricing, as well as mergers and their 
monopolistic products.  In addition, parallels can be noticed in each country’s use of 
administrative and regulatory agencies as a primary mechanism for enforcing these 
laws, embodied by the Interstate Commerce Commission in America and the Ministry 
of Commerce, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce in China.  The remaining question, then, is 
how to evaluate these similarities.  China has clearly been influenced by Western                                                         
68 Xiaoye Wang, “Highlights of China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law,” Antitrust Law Journal 75 (2008): 
135, accessed April 29, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27897572. 
69 “Competition Policy and Enforcement in China,” US-China Business Council, accessed April 29, 2015, 
https://www.uschina.org/reports/competition-policy-and-enforcement-china. 
 
 
32  
history in its efforts to address the issue of anti-competitive practices.  Is this a good 
thing?  Any answer to this question, of course, must consider the historical trend of 
government involvement in each country’s economy. 
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Conclusion 
It would appear as though China’s policies to restrain anti-competitive practices 
have met with relatively more success in a relatively shorter amount of time than the 
American laws that they resemble.  As I have already mentioned, whereas the United 
States enacted the Interstate Commerce Commission Act in 1887, President Roosevelt 
did not meaningfully affect the existence of monopolies in America until the Northern 
Securities Company case in 1904.  China, on the other hand, although it enacted its 
Anti-Monopoly Law as recently as 2007, has been cracking down on price fixing and 
non-government owned monopolies ever since. 
The success of Western-style antitrust legislation in China, however, is not as 
clear as one might be tempted to believe. Indeed, the mere notion that anti-monopoly 
legislation exists in a country whose economy has been dominated almost exclusively 
by state-owned monopolies for the better part of the past century, and where state-
owned monopolies still exist in several very important industries today, can be quite 
confusing.  It is thought that the true impetus for the introduction and passing of China’s 
Anti-Monopoly Law, then, was to protect its domestic markets from monopolization by 
foreign firms.70  If this is true, though, then time has yet to tell how the legislation will 
apply to China’s remaining state-owned banking and oil monopolies.  Some scholars 
have suggested that, for now, state control of the aforementioned industries has been 
allowed only as the result of ambiguities in the law’s language.71 
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This is very fortunate for China, but it should by no means be comforting.  It is 
not difficult to imagine what may have happened if, for example, Chinese courts had 
been as conservative in their readings of the Anti-Monopoly Law as the Supreme Court 
of the United States was when it decided the ultimate fate and limitations of America’s 
Interstate Commerce Commission Act.  It is not difficult to imagine the chaos that 
might have ensued if China’s remaining banking and petroleum monopolies had 
suddenly been declared illegal, sending those critical industries into a free fall that the 
market may not have been able to make up for in time.  If the similarities that exist 
between the anti-competitive practices used by firms in America’s and China’s drive to 
maturity phases yield any insight for Chinese lawmakers today, it is the importance of 
taking their own economic history into consideration when crafting and evaluating 
policies to address those practices.  There is no one-size-fits-all approach to competition 
law.
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